James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery

11-17-1995

DDASaccident033
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident033" (1995). Global CWD Repository. 233.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/233

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/03/2004

Accident number: 33

Accident time: 09:13

Accident Date: 17/11/1995

Where it occurred: Homoine, Inhambane
Province

Country: Mozambique

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 27/11/1995

ID original source: ADP-6/ MC/TL

Name of source: CND/IND/ADP

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: metal fragments

Date record created: 22/01/2004

Date last modified: 22/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate training (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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Accident report
An internal investigation of the accident was carried out by Technical Advisors with the
demining group and made available. The following summarises its content.
The demining platoon had "cleared 5,1602 metres and eight mines at Homoine before the
accident". The mines were laid in a narrow belt but not in a pattern. The mines found before
were PMN, PMN-2, PMD6 and POMZ2M. The victim was in a crouching position with his arm
outstretched (holding a trowel) when he initiated a PMN with his right foot. He was not using
his detector (which was 12 metres away). He was taken to hospital at 09:35 and arrived at
10:05. A blood shortage meant that other deminers had to donate three litres of blood.
The victim's boots, photographed by the researcher in 1995, are shown here.

The investigators stated that the detector (a Schiebel AN-19) was "working properly and was
capable of detecting a PMN at over 30cm depth". They found two fragments in the area
cleared by the victim. The striker and plunger spring of the PMN were discovered at the seat
of the explosion. The crater was 27cm deep – which the investigators took to indicate that the
mine was probably 5-10cm deep.

Recommendations
The investigators said that the use of both detectors and excavation should be phased out
where detectors could be used alone, and that deminers should get more training on using
detectors in contaminated soil. They further recommended that another detector that could be
used kneeling should be investigated. That deminers should be fined if they leave metal in
"cleared" areas, that the hospital should be warned to expect a casualty and deminers' blood
groups should be on their ID cards. They added that, at Inhambane hospital, medics should
stay with the patient to ensure he gets good care and food.

One investigator made a supplementary accident report regarding the victim's sobriety on
12th December 1995 after talking to the surgeon who did not suspect alcoholic influence.
Also, the victim's friends said he was not drinking the night before. The investigation into
sobriety went no further. The other investigator commented (4th September 1998): "I'm afraid
that I don't recall much … I do recall there was a hell of a lot of speculation that the guy was
drunk".
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Victim Report
Victim number: 49

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 38

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: no

Compensation: US$3,300

Time to hospital: 1 hour 8 minutes

Protection issued: Safety spectacles

Protection used: Safety spectacles

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Body
severe Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Through knee
Arm Above elbow
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The medic reported that at 09:13 hours a mine detonated and that the victim received medical
care after seven minutes. His injuries were "amputation caused by the mine to the left leg and
arm and deep wounds to the left side of the body. Traumatic shock (3rd degree) on arrival in
hospital.
The compensation award document (in Portuguese), signed on 16th July 1996, lists the
injuries as: amputation of the right arm at the shoulder; amputation of the right leg above the
knee, and deep lacerations to the left thigh. The victim was rated 100% physically disabled
and had severe scarring on the left leg. This report concluded that the victim could no longer
work as a deminer, and that he needed another person to assist him with his daily routine. He
was awarded 60% + 40% x 30 x US$110 (salary) = US$3,300.
The victim’s DOB was 27/05/57.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
was in breach of SOPs and was not corrected. The investigators suggest that both training
and equipment may have been inadequate, which may have been contributory senior
management failings. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
The researcher heard the rumour that the victim was intoxicated (from the investigator who
later decided that he was not) while visiting the demining group in 1995. There was no
conclusive evidence that he was, or was not. However, an independent investigation might
have been more likely to uncover the truth than an internal inquiry.
In case of confusion over the victim's activity at the time of the accident, he was supposed to
be both using a detector and "Excavation" to ten centimetres. Both should have been done
regardless of whether there were detector readings. While thorough, (and still in use by some
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groups in 1999) this method seems to lead to deminers seeing little point in bothering to use
the detector.
It is likely that his trowel, or parts of it, caused his upper arm injuries (as indicated informally).
The method of determining depth of the device by reference to the crater depth without
measuring the soil hardness is unreliable.
The “inadequate equipment (?)” noted refers to the issue of industrial safety spectacles as
PPE.

4

